qubit
Overclocked quantum bit
- Joined
- Dec 6, 2007
- Messages
- 17,865 (2.86/day)
- Location
- Quantum Well UK
System Name | Quantumville™ |
---|---|
Processor | Intel Core i7-2700K @ 4GHz |
Motherboard | Asus P8Z68-V PRO/GEN3 |
Cooling | Noctua NH-D14 |
Memory | 16GB (2 x 8GB Corsair Vengeance Black DDR3 PC3-12800 C9 1600MHz) |
Video Card(s) | MSI RTX 2080 SUPER Gaming X Trio |
Storage | Samsung 850 Pro 256GB | WD Black 4TB | WD Blue 6TB |
Display(s) | ASUS ROG Strix XG27UQR (4K, 144Hz, G-SYNC compatible) | Asus MG28UQ (4K, 60Hz, FreeSync compatible) |
Case | Cooler Master HAF 922 |
Audio Device(s) | Creative Sound Blaster X-Fi Fatal1ty PCIe |
Power Supply | Corsair AX1600i |
Mouse | Microsoft Intellimouse Pro - Black Shadow |
Keyboard | Yes |
Software | Windows 10 Pro 64-bit |
We have brought you the potential perils of the upcoming UEFI Forum-implemented - www.uefi.org - Windows 8 secure boot feature here, here and here. However, it appears that it may not be so 'secure' after all, since there appears to be a surefire way to circumvent it, at least for the moment, while it's in development.
Softpedia has scored an exclusive interview with security researcher Peter Kleissner, who has created various Windows (XP, Server 2003 etc) "bootkits", which allow OS infection at the highest privilege level, giving unrestricted access to the whole of the PC. His latest one, called Stoned Lite, shows how the Windows 8 secure boot process, still in development, can be subverted, as it stands. He is planning to release details of how the code works at the upcoming International Malware Conference (MalCon) - http://malcon.org - that will take place in India on November 25th. It appears that the real vulnerability exists in the legacy BIOS boot procedure, not in Microsoft's implementation of secure boot, as Kleissner said:
And as Softpedia put it:
Kleissner explained that the basic way Stoned Lite works is by using command line escalation:
So, this problem is only present if someone has physical access to the computer and is able to boot off a CD or USB stick. Therefore, this security vulnerability will have no impact in many scenarios where the threat of this kind of attack is very low. Examples include the home environment (usually) and data centres with very good physical security and the other measures they have in place. The most likely place for problems could be in workplaces where someone boots a PC after hours and installs a keylogger or other malware on the system. A significant threat, to be sure. However, despite this vulnerability, secure boot still makes conventional malware attacks useless, such as drive-by downloads from malicious or hacked websites and opening attachments from spam emails, among the many infection vectors around.
Still, it makes Microsoft's bold claim in September, that:
Note that Kleissner will not be at MalCon in person, because he will be attending another conference held on the same day, the European Bitcoin Conference in Prague, where he will show "how to re-direct locally initiated BitCoin transactions, but also show how the BitCoin wallet can be secured better against theft." Therefore, someone else will go in his place to deliver the message, or he may pre-record it.
Finally, while this is a big step forward for PC security, like every other security improvement, there's always a hack to get around it with time somehow, somewhere, which can then be patched and hacked and patched... However, in this case, when the secure boot system goes live and a core vulnerability is found in the UEFI or some other low level component, patching won't be so simple, or maybe even impossible, due to its low level nature. So, once again the suspicion remains that this whole 'initiative' is a backdoor to locking out competing operating systems such as Linux and to DRM your whole PC to 'protect' the profits of big content, in a similar way they already do on games consoles.
There's a lot of big corporate interests riding on secure boot, so do not ever rule out the possibility that it will be subverted to further them.
View at TechPowerUp Main Site
Softpedia has scored an exclusive interview with security researcher Peter Kleissner, who has created various Windows (XP, Server 2003 etc) "bootkits", which allow OS infection at the highest privilege level, giving unrestricted access to the whole of the PC. His latest one, called Stoned Lite, shows how the Windows 8 secure boot process, still in development, can be subverted, as it stands. He is planning to release details of how the code works at the upcoming International Malware Conference (MalCon) - http://malcon.org - that will take place in India on November 25th. It appears that the real vulnerability exists in the legacy BIOS boot procedure, not in Microsoft's implementation of secure boot, as Kleissner said:
The problem with the legacy startup is that no one verifies the MBR, which makes it the vulnerable point. With UEFI and secure boot, all the boot applications and drivers have to be signed (otherwise they won't be loaded). You can compare it to TPM, although Arie van der Hoeven from Microsoft announced that the secure boot feature is mandatory for OEMs who want to be UEFI certified. It is a good message that security is not an option.
And as Softpedia put it:
Stoned Lite actually works by infecting the MBR, while storing its components "outside the normal file system." Startup files are "hooked" and "patched" before Windows starts, these files being changed in Windows 7.
Kleissner explained that the basic way Stoned Lite works is by using command line escalation:
As payload I use the command line privilege escalation. Once whoami.exe is launched, it elevates the cmd.exe process rights to SYSTEM by overwriting its security token with a duplicated system process one.
Additionally it will patch the password validation function (MsvpPasswordValidate) so you can use any password for any local user account to log on. You will be able to start Stoned Lite from a USB flash drive or CD where it will be only active in memory.
So, this problem is only present if someone has physical access to the computer and is able to boot off a CD or USB stick. Therefore, this security vulnerability will have no impact in many scenarios where the threat of this kind of attack is very low. Examples include the home environment (usually) and data centres with very good physical security and the other measures they have in place. The most likely place for problems could be in workplaces where someone boots a PC after hours and installs a keylogger or other malware on the system. A significant threat, to be sure. However, despite this vulnerability, secure boot still makes conventional malware attacks useless, such as drive-by downloads from malicious or hacked websites and opening attachments from spam emails, among the many infection vectors around.
Still, it makes Microsoft's bold claim in September, that:
a little less reassuring, doesn't it?Secured boot stops malware in its tracks and makes Windows 8 significantly more resistant to low-level attacks. Even when a virus has made it onto your PC, Windows will authenticate boot components to prevent any attempt to start malware before the operating system is up and running.
Note that Kleissner will not be at MalCon in person, because he will be attending another conference held on the same day, the European Bitcoin Conference in Prague, where he will show "how to re-direct locally initiated BitCoin transactions, but also show how the BitCoin wallet can be secured better against theft." Therefore, someone else will go in his place to deliver the message, or he may pre-record it.
Finally, while this is a big step forward for PC security, like every other security improvement, there's always a hack to get around it with time somehow, somewhere, which can then be patched and hacked and patched... However, in this case, when the secure boot system goes live and a core vulnerability is found in the UEFI or some other low level component, patching won't be so simple, or maybe even impossible, due to its low level nature. So, once again the suspicion remains that this whole 'initiative' is a backdoor to locking out competing operating systems such as Linux and to DRM your whole PC to 'protect' the profits of big content, in a similar way they already do on games consoles.
There's a lot of big corporate interests riding on secure boot, so do not ever rule out the possibility that it will be subverted to further them.
View at TechPowerUp Main Site