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System Name | RBMK-1000 |
---|---|
Processor | AMD Ryzen 7 5700G |
Motherboard | ASUS ROG Strix B450-E Gaming |
Cooling | DeepCool Gammax L240 V2 |
Memory | 2x 8GB G.Skill Sniper X |
Video Card(s) | Palit GeForce RTX 2080 SUPER GameRock |
Storage | Western Digital Black NVMe 512GB |
Display(s) | BenQ 1440p 60 Hz 27-inch |
Case | Corsair Carbide 100R |
Audio Device(s) | ASUS SupremeFX S1220A |
Power Supply | Cooler Master MWE Gold 650W |
Mouse | ASUS ROG Strix Impact |
Keyboard | Gamdias Hermes E2 |
Software | Windows 11 Pro |
Air-ViBeR is a new cyber-security vulnerability that uses changes in your PC's fan vibrations to sneak out data through an elaborate, convoluted method involving more than one compromised device. There is an infinitesimal and purely mathematical chance of this type of cyberattack affecting you, however one can't help but admire the ingenuity behind it, the stuff of Hollywood.
Created by Mordechai Guri at the Cyber Security Research Center at Ben-Gurion University, Israel, Air-ViBeR involves a compromised PC regulating its fan-speeds to alter the PC's acoustics rapidly, to relay data to an Internet-connected listening device, such as a compromised smartphone, which then converts those vibrations into ones and zeroes to transmit to the web. There's no way this method will transmit a your 100-gigabyte C: in a lifetime, let alone the few hours that your smartphone is placed on the same desk as your PC; but the attacker would look for something specific and something that fits within 4 KB (one block, or 32,768 bits). Guri demonstrated his method and wrote a paper on it explaining what he calls "air gap covert channels."
A video presentation by Mordechai Guri follows.
View at TechPowerUp Main Site
Created by Mordechai Guri at the Cyber Security Research Center at Ben-Gurion University, Israel, Air-ViBeR involves a compromised PC regulating its fan-speeds to alter the PC's acoustics rapidly, to relay data to an Internet-connected listening device, such as a compromised smartphone, which then converts those vibrations into ones and zeroes to transmit to the web. There's no way this method will transmit a your 100-gigabyte C: in a lifetime, let alone the few hours that your smartphone is placed on the same desk as your PC; but the attacker would look for something specific and something that fits within 4 KB (one block, or 32,768 bits). Guri demonstrated his method and wrote a paper on it explaining what he calls "air gap covert channels."
A video presentation by Mordechai Guri follows.
View at TechPowerUp Main Site