Thursday, January 30th 2025

Apple Silicon Vulnerabilities Highlighted by FLOP & SLAP Side-channel Attacks

An academic collaboration—between research departments at Georgia Institute of Technology and Ruhr University Bochum—has produced two white paper studies that disclose details regarding the vulnerable nature of certain generations of Apple Silicon. The documents were made available online earlier in the week; readily accessible through their Predictors.Fail webpage. The "SLAP" attack paper's moniker is derived/abbreviated from its long-form title: "Data Speculation Attacks via Load Address Prediction on Apple" Silicon. A similarly uncatchy acronymization has been generated by the second paper's full title: "Breaking the Apple M3 CPU via False Load Output Predictions"—aka "FLOP" attack. The North American and German security research teams have partnered up in the past—their "iLeakage" speculative execution side-channel attack was documented back in October 2023.

Spectre and Meltdown are the original, and likely most famous/notorious examples of speculative execution CPU vulnerability—owners of particular processor architectures were affected at the start of 2018. The Predictors.Fail bulletin proposes that the latest side-channel attacks affect Apple hardware of 2021 vintage and beyond. The teams introduced SLAP as: "a new speculative execution attack that arises from optimizing data dependencies, as opposed to control flow dependencies." They believe that Apple models: "starting with the M2 and A15 are equipped with a Load Address Predictor (LAP), which improves performance by guessing the next memory address the CPU will retrieve data from based on prior memory access patterns. However, if the LAP guesses wrong, it causes the CPU to perform arbitrary computations on out-of-bounds data, which should never have been accessed to begin with, under speculative execution. Building on this observation, we demonstrate the real-world security risks of the LAP via an end-to-end attack on the Safari web browser, where an unprivileged remote adversary can recover email content and browsing behavior."
Likewise, the security experts have outlined similar findings with FLOP—their paper demonstrates: "that Apple's M3 and A17 generation and newer CPUs are equipped with a Load Value Predictor (LVP). The LVP improves performance on data dependencies by guessing the data value that will be returned by the memory subsystem on the next access by the CPU core, before the value is actually available. If the LVP guesses wrong, the CPU can perform arbitrary computations on incorrect data under speculative execution. This can cause critical checks in program logic for memory safety to be bypassed, opening attack surfaces for leaking secrets stored in memory. We demonstrate the LVP's dangers by orchestrating these attacks on both the Safari and Chrome web browsers in the form of arbitrary memory read primitives, recovering location history, calendar events, and credit card information."

Bleeping Computer managed to extract an official response from Apple—following Georgia Tech and Ruhr U. Bochum staffers forwarding their findings to Santa Clara HQ. An anonymous Apple spokesperson stated: "We want to thank the researchers for their collaboration as this proof of concept advances our understanding of these types of threats. Based on our analysis, we do not believe this issue poses an immediate risk to our users."

Phoronix's Michael Larabel kindly summarized these findings into a simplified list of Apple products: "all Mac laptops since 2022, all Mac desktops since 2023, and all iPhones / iPad Pro / iPad Air / iPad Mini models since 2021 are affected by these new SLAP and FLOP attacks."
Sources: Bleeding Computer, 9to5mac, Hackster.io, Tom's Hardware, Mac Rumors, White Papers at Predictors.Fail
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8 Comments on Apple Silicon Vulnerabilities Highlighted by FLOP & SLAP Side-channel Attacks

#1
bonehead123
Ok, so just throw away all of your recent Apple devices & eat the $1000's of dollars you spent on them....OR

have the fruity bois come up with a patch for these vulnerabilities YET ?
T0@stwe do not believe this issue poses an immediate risk to our users."
Until it does, then what ????????
Posted on Reply
#2
MentalAcetylide
bonehead123Ok, so just throw away all of your recent Apple devices & eat the $1000's of dollars you spent on them....OR

have the fruity bois come up with a patch for these vulnerabilities YET ?

Until it does, then what ????????
The scary thing is that "all" systems have their vulnerabilities, knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. Nevertheless, businesses like cheap, quick, & convenient more than they do security.
Posted on Reply
#3
AnotherReader
Real World Technologies has a good discussion of this vulnerability. Apparently, AMD evaluated value prediction for the K9, but didn't think it was worth it in the end, and Ice Lake might have had it enabled before Spectre. As for context, Apple was given a lot of time and they still haven't addressed it:
SLAP

We disclosed our results to Apple on May 24, 2024.
Apple’s Product Security Team have acknowledged our
report and proof-of-concept code, requesting an extended
embargo beyond the 90-day window. At the time of writing,
Apple did not share any schedule regarding mitigation plans
concerning the results presented in this paper.

FLOP

Responsible Disclosure. We disclosed our results to Apple’s
Product Security Team on September 3, 2024. Apple has
acknowledged our disclosure and is continuing to investigate
our report.
Posted on Reply
#4
Visible Noise
Turns out it's a big nothingburger and the "researchers" (students) should have read the ARM documentation.


social.treehouse.systems/@marcan/113914534615474981

developer.arm.com/documentation/101550/0001/AArch64-registers/AArch64-register-descriptions/AArch64-Generic-System-control-register-description/SSBS--Speculative-Store-Bypass-Safe
Speculative Store Bypass Safe.

Prohibits speculative loads or stores which might practically allow a cache timing side channel.

A cache timing side channel might be exploited where a load or store uses an address that is derived from a register that is being loaded from memory using a load instruction speculatively read from a memory location. If PSTATE.SSBS is enabled, the address derived from the load instruction might be from earlier in the coherence order than the latest store to that memory location with the same virtual address.

0b0
Hardware is not permitted to load or store speculatively, in a manner that could practically give rise to a cache timing side channel, using an address derived from a register value that has been loaded from memory using a load instruction (L) that speculatively reads an entry from earlier in the coherence order from that location being loaded from than the entry generated by the latest store (S) to that location using the same virtual address as L.

0b1
Hardware is permitted to load or store speculatively, in a manner that could practically give rise to a cache timing side channel, using an address derived from a register value that has been loaded from memory using a load instruction (L) that speculatively reads an entry from earlier in the coherence order fro that location being loaded from than the entry generated by the latest store (S) to that location using the same virtual address as L.

The value of this bit is set to the value in the SCTLR_ELx.DSSBS field on taking an exception to ELx.
Posted on Reply
#5
_roman_
Very nice. I think some other brand bring up patches faster.

Has anyone the CVE for that SLAP and SLOP please?
Posted on Reply
#6
AnotherReader
Visible NoiseTurns out it's a big nothingburger and the "researchers" (students) should have read the ARM documentation.


social.treehouse.systems/@marcan/113914534615474981

developer.arm.com/documentation/101550/0001/AArch64-registers/AArch64-register-descriptions/AArch64-Generic-System-control-register-description/SSBS--Speculative-Store-Bypass-Safe
SSBS is off by default; ergo, the hardware is vulnerable. The authors also credited Hector:
While FLOP has an actionable mitigation, implementing it requires patches from software vendors and cannot be done by users. Apple has communicated to us that they plan to address these issues in an upcoming security update, hence it is important to enable automatic updates and ensure that your devices are running the latest operating system and applications.

Update: SLAP was found to have an actionable mitigation that also requires software patches. This is in the form of clearing the Speculative Store Bypass Safe (SSBS) bit, which is set by default. See @marcan's post for further details - thank you Hector!
Posted on Reply
#7
lexluthermiester
bonehead123Until it does, then what ????????
They're not wrong. While vulnerabilities exist, they require very special and difficult(read near impossible without direct physical access) conditions to exploit, situations made doubly difficult due to Apples walled-garden software business model.

While this is a thing, and very interesting, it's no different then the all than all the other side channel attack types. It's worth of notation and correction. It's not worth consumers worrying about.
Posted on Reply
#8
Visible Noise
AnotherReaderSSBS is off by default; ergo, the hardware is vulnerable. The authors also credited Hector:
The app is supposed to turn it on if it’s running untrusted code. It’s off by default on every arm chip.

Like I sad, they could have just read the ARM documentation. I hope they didn’t spend a lot of time “researching“ this.
Posted on Reply
Jan 30th, 2025 21:20 EST change timezone

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