Tuesday, March 20th 2018
CTS-Labs Releases Masterkey Exploit Proof-of-Concept Video
CTS-Labs, the cyber security research firm that claims to have unearthed severe security vulnerabilities with AMD "Zen" CPU architecture, posted its first proof-of-concept demo video. This video deals with the "Masterkey" class of exploits, specifically Masterkey-1. The Masterkey class makes for 3 of the 13 vulnerabilities the firm discovered. As a quick refresher, Masterkey is an exploit of the Secure Boot feature, specifically getting around the feature's system integrity check on AMD "Zen" powered systems, by using a specially programmed system BIOS. Any privileged program (even from within Windows), can flash your system BIOS, and get around Secure Boot in the following system reboot (or even brick your system by writing a non-bootable BIOS image). The BIOS can then tinker with the ring -3 (minus 3) software running on Secure Processor, and survive reboots or OS re-installs. It would also be undetectable by traditional antivirus programs that can't have ring -3 access while running on top of an operating system.
In the video, we're shown a somewhat step-by-step process of infecting a TYAN-made server motherboard with a modified BIOS that has the Masterkey exploit. The demo BIOS by CTS, which has ARM Cortex A5-compatible code for the Secure Processor, makes it flicker its status code between "1337" and "7331" during POST, and go on to boot the OS as if nothing happened. It can be made to do anything once you've reached that far. CTS-Labs claims that it has a more elaborate shell code for Secure Processor that probably does more insidious things, but it won't be showing that to the public in this video. The objective of this demo appears to be to establish a proof-of-concept.The video follows.
CTS-Labs stated that it's currently filming similar proof-of-concept videos for each of the other exploits.
In the video, we're shown a somewhat step-by-step process of infecting a TYAN-made server motherboard with a modified BIOS that has the Masterkey exploit. The demo BIOS by CTS, which has ARM Cortex A5-compatible code for the Secure Processor, makes it flicker its status code between "1337" and "7331" during POST, and go on to boot the OS as if nothing happened. It can be made to do anything once you've reached that far. CTS-Labs claims that it has a more elaborate shell code for Secure Processor that probably does more insidious things, but it won't be showing that to the public in this video. The objective of this demo appears to be to establish a proof-of-concept.The video follows.
CTS-Labs stated that it's currently filming similar proof-of-concept videos for each of the other exploits.
50 Comments on CTS-Labs Releases Masterkey Exploit Proof-of-Concept Video
If I log in to a server with pre-known credentials and shred its files, the shredding itself is not a remote exploit.
However, if I am able to do remote unauthenticated actions on a system, that's a remote exploit.
Being able to bypass BIOS signatures by itself is a local exploit which many would categorize as a secondary exploit. If confirmed, it's certainly serious, but nowhere near damning for AMD. But combine this with one or two other exploits, and you can execute an attack on a system.
Judging by the video, either the verification of BIOS signatures have to be defective, or the attacker is in possession of the signing key. (assuming the video is genuine)
Proper BIOS verification would require a correctly implemented public/private cryptography.
that prevention again is easy to get around if you have the hardware in front of you, but each security step is just making it less attractive but it never prevents as there will always be a security hole.
Anyone defending this crap makes them a shill, whether they have the brains to know it or not.
www.anandtech.com/show/12556/amd-confirms-exploits-patched-in-weeks
The salient high-level takeaway from AMD is this:
- All the issues can be confirmed on related AMD hardware, but require Admin Access at the metal
- All the issues are set to be fixed within weeks, not months, through firmware patches and BIOS updates
- No performance impact expected
- None of these issues are Zen-specific, but relate to the PSP and ASMedia chipsets.
- These are not related to the GPZ exploits earlier this year.
Can we now, please, have big banners with FUD written on them ?You can do this on any PC and consequences can be just as bad as updating a firmware for the security processor.
blog.trailofbits.com/2018/03/15/amd-flaws-technical-summary/
Quote from the above:
"There is no immediate risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities for most users. Even if the full details were published today, attackers would need to invest significant development efforts to build attack tools that utilize these vulnerabilities. This level of effort is beyond the reach of most attackers (see www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf, Figure 1) "
No? Then no, sorry. You aren't supposed to be able to replace ME and PSP bios areas. They are signed.
Seriously, quit fanboying out of the woodwork to defend AMD and call anything against it "FUD." This is rather sickening and I LIKE AMD.
An update to article.
The FUD was FUD all along.
What do we call those that dismiss this before other experts weigh in*? Clairvoyants maybe?
*A handful of them have and declared the vulerabilities real.
It's true that they require admin access first (we already knew that), but the problem is they're a vector to installing further backdoors.
Problem reported, problem (soon to be) solved. I hope we can all move along now.
As such it's nothing but FUD based on how it was represented.
Vector for installing backdoors on systems where you have unsupervised access and OS is on baremetal and where you have admin and where BIOS flash is allowed. I can install a lot of backdoors on such system. No exploits needed, actually.
Edit: also, no BIOS flash needed, read the latest update on the original article.
edit: and again, now you missed the second part of what i said. "but the impact was incorrect and possible usage very limited. Assessment that fixing is impossible or will take very long time didnt hold aswell. "